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UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
On January 28, 2005, Luis Moreno
Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, announced that
the ICC will dispatch a team to Côte
d’Ivoire to determine whether to initiate a
full-scale investigation of the human rights
abuses and war crimes that occurred during
the civil war that followed an attempted
coup against the current President, Laurent
Gbagbo, in September 2002. Ocampo’s
announcement was a response to a
September 2003 request by the Ivoirian
government for the ICC to investigate
alleged war crimes in Côte d’Ivoire.
The submission to the ICC pertains to
violence that erupted after an attempted
coup against Gbagbo on September 19,
2002, when insurgents secured control over
the country’s cocoa-rich northern region.
Three major anti-Gbagbo militias rose to
power in 2002: the Patriotic Movement of
Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), the Ivoirian Popular
Movement of the Great West (MPIGO),
and the Movement for Justice and Peace
(MJP). The pro-Gbagbo and rebel forces
blame each other for the thousands of
deaths, rapes, and other atrocities that have
occurred since the coup attempt.
The broader current conflict stems from
a series of prior coup attempts that ensued
after President Robert Guei violently seized
power in 1999. Continuous fighting, fueled
in part by ex-Liberian President Charles
Taylor, perpetuated a war in Côte d’Ivoire’s
western region. In October 2001, the country’s Supreme Court recognized Laurent
Gbagbo as president after violent clashes
between Gbagbo and his contender, former
President Guei. Gbagbo maintained power
despite a separate coup attempt in January
of 2001.
Since May 2003, the United Nations has
been instrumental in trying to facilitate
peace in Cote d’Ivoire. In response to the
continued violence in Côte d’Ivoire, in
February 2004, the UN authorized a 6,000strong peacekeeping force, supplemented by
a 4,000-strong French Rapid Reaction

Force, to monitor the demilitarized zone
separating the insurgents in the north from
the governmental forces in the south.
Despite ongoing negotiations, multiple
peace agreements, and the UN’s peacekeeping efforts, however, the situation in
Côte d’Ivoire remains highly volatile.
As part of its continuing operations in
Côte d’Ivoire, the UN Security Council
approved an International Commission of
Inquiry (Commission), established by the
Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, to investigate abuses that
occurred after the September 2002 coup
attempt, the time period over which the
ICC may exercise jurisdiction. The
Commission’s report, which is currently
with the UN Secretary General, has not
been officially released, although a copy in
French was leaked in January 2005. The
report is said to contain an annex which lists
alleged offenders. The document reportedly
identifies 95 alleged perpetrators, including
senior rebel officers and government officials
responsible for crimes including extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and inciting
ethnic hatred. Chief Prosecutor Ocampo
maintains that he has not yet seen the list.
The Commission’s report apparently recommended ICC prosecution of the alleged
perpetrators. The ICC has jurisdiction over
crimes committed on the territory of a State
Party to the Rome Statute after the Statute’s
entry into force on July 1, 2002. Although
Côte d’Ivoire signed the ICC’s Rome Statute
on November 30, 1998, it has not ratified
the Statute. Côte d’Ivoire may still request
ICC involvement under Article 12 of the
Rome Statute even though it is not a State
Party to the Statute. Article 12(3) provides
that “a State which is not a Party to this
Statute . . . may, by declaration lodged with
the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the
crime in question.” On February 15, 2005,
the ICC Registrar confirmed that Cote
d’Ivoire accepted ICC jurisdiction for crimes
committed in its territory since September
19, 2002.
President Gbagbo’s acceptance of ICC
jurisdiction may determine the fate of his
wife and other government officers, who are
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potentially subject to ICC investigations.
UN diplomats indicated that the controversial list of alleged offenders implicates
President Gbagbo’s wife, Simone Gbagbo, in
directing a death squad to kill her husband’s
rivals. At least two Security Council members have confirmed that Simone Gbagbo
and Charles Ble Goude, leader of a proGbagbo militia commonly known as the
Young Patriots, are among those listed in the
UN report. Goude is allegedly accused of
acts such as kidnapping, inciting violence,
stirring racial hatred, and disturbing public
order. The recently-leaked information does
not reveal the precise nature of the offenses,
nor does it articulate the exact accusations
being made. Côte d’Ivoire’s UN ambassador,
Philippe D. Djangone-Bi, denied the accusations against the first lady. Djangone-Bi
emphasized Mrs. Gbagbo’s strong dedication to human rights and democracy over
the past 30 years.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
On March 15, 2005, Pre Trial Chamber
I of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
convened a closed session status conference
with Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to
discuss the current situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
According to international and nongovernmental organizations, since the start of ICC
jurisdiction in 2002, continuous armed conflict between state-sponsored rebel groups
has ravaged the DRC with mass murders,
summary executions, rape, torture, and
forced displacement.
Violence first erupted in the DRC on
May 16, 1997, when the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the
Congo (AFDL) toppled Mobutu Sese Seko,
former president of the Republic of Zaïre,
and Laurent Désiré Kabila rose to power as
the new president of the DRC. In 1998, the
AFDL ignited a rebellion against Laurent
Kabila in which Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad,
and Namibia supported the Kabila loyalist
army. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi also
sponsored two major rebel groups in the
conflict, the Congolese Rally for Democracy
and the Movement for the Liberation of the

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 11
Congo, with the aim of overthrowing
Laurent Kabila. Kabila was assassinated on
January 16, 2001, and his son, Josef Kabila,
succeeded him as president. Despite a series
of peace agreements and ceasefires, beginning with the Lusaka Agreement in July
1999, over three million civilians have died
in the DRC due to the armed conflict and
related malnutrition.
On April 19, 2004, Ocampo received a
letter from President Kabila conferring ICC
jurisdiction over crimes committed in the
territory after the Rome Statute entered into
force on July 1, 2002. In his letter, President
Kabila asked Ocampo to determine if one or
more persons should be charged with war
crimes and agreed to cooperate with the
ICC. Ocampo will determine whether there
is a reasonable basis to initiate a full-scale
investigation. He is examining the basis for
an investigation under the Statute and the
modalities for such an inquiry to reach an
informed decision.

DARFUR UPDATE
JUST BEFORE MIDNIGHT on Thursday, March
31, 2005, the United Nations Security
Council adopted a resolution to refer the
situation in Sudan’s Darfur region to the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court (ICC or Court). Resolution 1593,
which addresses developments in Darfur
since July 1, 2002, was adopted by a vote of
11 in favor of the Resolution, with Algeria,
Brazil, China, and the United States abstaining. Brazil, a supporter of the court,
abstained in order to express its disagreement with concessions contained in the
Resolution aimed at preventing a U.S. veto.
The two main Darfur rebel groups welcomed the Resolution and said they would
comply by sending any members of their
groups accused of crimes to the ICC. The
Sudanese government, however, did not
welcome the move. “I believe it is unfair, illadvised and narrow-minded,” Sudan’s state
minister for foreign affairs, Najeeb al-Kheir
Abdul Wahab, told reporters. “It undermines the government’s quest for justice
in Darfur through reconciliation.” The
Secretary-General, however, congratulated
the Council members “for overcoming their
differences to allow [it] to act to ensure that
those responsible for atrocities in Darfur are
held to account.”
The United Nations Security Council
was recently in bitter disagreement about

how to address the numerous suspected war
crimes committed in Darfur. China and the
United States, two of the five countries with
veto power over Security Council actions,
threatened to stall any ICC referral for
accountability in Darfur. China and Algeria
both argued that an attempt to bring
Sudanese government, rebel, or Janjaweed
militia leaders to justice before establishing
peace in Darfur would be counterproductive. These two countries suggested that the
Sudanese government should prosecute serious crimes against humanity within its own
national legal system. Such a course of
action would have raised serious questions
regarding Sudan’s will to investigate the
crimes, prosecutorial and judicial independence, and potential for corruption, because
the Sudanese government itself is implicated
heavily in the crimes.
The United States, which called the
Darfur crisis “genocide” in late 2004, had
been at the forefront of recommending
tough action on Sudan. The United States
strongly opposes the ICC, however, because
it fears that U.S. forces or officials could be
the subject of politically-motivated referrals
to the Court. Members of the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations argued that supporting the referral of the Darfur situation to the
ICC would imply U.S. support for the ICC
in general. As an alternative to an ICC referral, they recommended the creation of a
permanent African war crimes tribunal in
Arusha, Tanzania, at the seat of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR).
Others have argued that U.S. agreement
to refer the Darfur crimes to the ICC would
not necessarily conflict with the United
States’ policy on the Court. An ICC investigation of crimes in Darfur would not expose
any U.S. national or the government to
criminal liability before the ICC.
Additionally, the United States has argued
that the Security Council should have the
exclusive power to refer such situations to
the ICC. In referring the matter to the ICC,
the United States could argue that Security
Council referrals are the only valid route to
ICC prosecutions and that countries that are
not party to the ICC remain immune from
ICC control in the absence of such a referral.
In addition to advocating for an immediate
response to what the United States has
deemed genocide in Darfur, such a course of
action may help repair the damaged reputation of the United States on international
38

human rights and its weak support of the
UN. Finally, it may give the United States
leverage in seeking genuine sanctions against
Sudan. The United States already proposed a
Security Council resolution, Resolution
1591, adopted on March 24, 2005. This
Resolution sought to impose an arms
embargo, an asset freeze on violators of a
cease-fire in Darfur, and restrictions on
offensive government military flights.
Resolution 1591, however, omitted a venue
for the trials.
The political will for a referral of the
crisis to the ICC came after a report, submitted in January 2005 by a UN-appointed
commission of inquiry, accused the
Sudanese government and militia of
“heinous crimes” in the western Sudanese
region. The report included a list of 51 likely suspects; evidence of thousands of
killings, pillaging, and rape in Darfur; and
an approximation of 70,000 people dead
and two million forced from their homes.
The commission of inquiry, made up of
international legal experts, recommended
referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC
for investigation and prosecution.
Resolution 1593, adopted by the
Security Council, states that “the
Government of Sudan and all other parties
to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully
with and provide any necessary assistance to
the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to
this resolution and, while recognizing that
States not party to the Rome Statute have no
obligation under the Statute, urges all States
and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully.”
Additionally, in order to assuage the fears of
the United States, the Resolution notes that
“nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside
Sudan which is not a party to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of that contributing State for all alleged acts
or omissions arising out of or related to
operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union,
unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been
expressly waived by that contributing State.”
The resolution also invited the ICC and
the African Union (AU) to discuss practical
arrangements to aid the work of the
Prosecutor and Court, including the possibility of conducting the proceedings in the
region to “contribute to regional efforts in
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the fight against impunity.” The diplomatic
showdown over the Darfur crisis marks a
defining moment for the ICC—the first
referral by the Security Council of a situation to the Court.

RWANDA
ELIÉZER NIYITEGEKA V. PROSECUTOR,
CASE NO. ICTR-96-14-A
On July 9, 2004, the Appeals Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) delivered its judgment in the
case of Eliézer Niyitegeka v. Prosecutor. The case
was brought on appeal from a May 16, 2003,
trial judgment finding Niyitegeka guilty on six
counts: genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit
genocide; and murder, extermination, and
other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. The Trial Chamber sentenced Niyitegeka,
who served as Rwanda’s Minister of
Information during the course of the 1994
genocide, to life imprisonment. Niyitegeka
(Appellant) raised 53 grounds for appeal, alleging errors of both law and fact. The Appeals
Chamber (Chamber) divided Appellant’s
grounds of appeal into eight categories, noting
that, pursuant to Article 24 of the ICTR
Statute, it must defer to the factual findings of
the Trial Chamber and would only “revoke or
revise” them if they found them to be “wholly
erroneous” and if the error(s) “occasioned a
miscarriage of justice.” The Chamber further
noted that it “cannot be expected to consider a
party’s submissions in detail if they are obscure,
contradictory, vague, or suffer from other formal and obvious insufficiencies.” Thirteen of
Appellant’s grounds for appeal were dismissed
for their failure to meet this standard. The
Chamber also dismissed the eight categories of
claims it considered at length and affirmed the
Trial Chamber’s sentence.

GENOCIDAL INTENT
The Appellant’s sole substantive ground of
appeal alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in
its interpretation of the specific intent requirement for the crime of genocide under Article
2(2) of the ICTR Statute. This article states, in
part, “Genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such.” In particular,
Appellant argued that the Trial Chamber erred
in law because it should have interpreted the
words “as such” to mean “solely.” He contended that, in failing to do so, the Trial Chamber
impermissibly expanded the definition of

genocidal intent, interpreting it as the commission of “specified acts against a gathering of
persons because they were believed to be the
enemy or supporters of the enemy,” rather
than acts against a group solely because of their
membership in it. The Chamber disagreed and
cited the Kayishema and Ruzindana ruling,
which held that even if a perpetrator is not
motivated solely by the intention to destroy a
certain group, the existence of other personal
motives does not exclude his or her criminal
responsibility. “In other words,” the Chamber
noted, “the term ‘as such’ clarifies the specific
intent requirement,” and the Trial Chamber
was correct in interpreting it to mean that the
proscribed acts were committed against the
victims “because of their membership in the
protected group, but not solely because of such
membership.”

PROCEDURAL ERROR
Appellant also alleged that the integrity of
the trial process had been undermined by the
participation of Prosecution counsel Melinda
Pollard, who had been under suspension from
the practice of law at the time. The Chamber
held that the integrity of the trial process could
not have been undermined per se by counsel
Pollard’s suspension, noting the Tribunal’s
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules) stipulate admission qualifications only for defense
counsel and are silent on corresponding qualifications for Prosecution counsel. Nevertheless,
Prosecution counsel are required to adhere to
the Tribunal’s standards of professional conduct, as well as to the Charter of the United
Nations and its Staff Rules and Regulations,
“which include a duty to act with integrity and
honesty.” The Chamber found no concrete evidence, nor did Appellant identify any specific
instance, that the suspension of Counsel
Pollard’s license to practice law in New York
“affected his trial or rendered it unfair.”
Moreover, because it was never shown that
Pollard’s representations at trial were factually
incorrect—indeed, they were confirmed by the
senior trial attorney on appeal—the Trial
Chamber did not err in law by relying on
Pollard’s “representations and undertaking.”
Appellant then argued that the Trial
Chamber erred as a matter of law by not recusing itself after counsel Pollard, in crossexamining a witness, alleged that Appellant
had implicated himself in commissions of rape.
Appellant said this was a “highly prejudicial
matter” that the judges could not expunge
from their minds. The Chamber disagreed,
affirming the holding in Akayesu (and the
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International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia’s [ICTY] holding in
Prosecutor v. Furundzija) that an appellant has
the burden to rebut the presumption of impartiality that attaches to a judge or a tribunal.
The Chamber determined that Appellant
failed do this, noting in particular that the Trial
Chamber had not found him guilty of rape as
a crime against humanity.
Appellant next alleged that he had suffered
an incurable disadvantage at trial because the
indictment provided him inadequate notice of
certain allegations made against him. In its
response, the Chamber reiterated the ICTY
Appeals Judgment in Kupresckic, which held
that in an indictment the Prosecution is obligated to state the material facts underpinning
all charges brought, but not the evidence by
which such materials are to be proven. Failure
to set forth the specific material facts of a crime
constitutes a “material defect” in the indictment that may, in certain circumstances, cause
the Appeals Chamber to reverse a conviction
—though not automatically. The Chamber
agreed that Appellant “had insufficient notice
of two material facts underpinning the charges
against him” regarding his alleged participation
in two attacks on the towns of Kivumu and
Muyira Hill in mid-May 1994. The Chamber
therefore agreed that the Trial Chamber had
committed an error of law in relying on this
evidence. Nevertheless, it found that such
errors did not invalidate the Trial Chamber’s
decision, as no conviction on any count of the
indictment rested solely on Appellant’s alleged
involvement in those two attacks.

STANDARD OF PROOF
The Chamber found without merit
Appellant’s claim that the Trial Chamber had
required him to prove his alibi beyond a reasonable doubt, and rejected his assertion that
his evidentiary burden should only have been
to show that, “on the balance of probabilities,
he was where he says he was.” It held that the
approach articulated at trial conformed to the
settled jurisprudence that “a defendant need
only produce evidence likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case” and that
the Trial Chamber “correctly stated that the
Prosecution bears the burden of proof and that
an alibi defense does not bear a separate burden.” The Chamber also found that Appellant
had failed to show any instance in which the
Trial Chamber did not apply the same
standards in assessing Defense and Prosecution
evidence.
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WITNESS TESTIMONY
The Chamber also dismissed Appellant’s
argument that the Trial Chamber erred in permitting the Prosecution to call witnesses without providing a reasonable explanation for the
alleged unavailability of their original statements, and by treating the Prosecution’s investigation notes as privileged under Rule 70. The
Chamber acknowledged that, while the
Prosecution has a duty to make available all
“statements” of witnesses it intends to call at
trial (pursuant to Rule 66(A)(ii) of the Rules),
the jurisprudence has not made a clear distinction between “statements” and “internal documents prepared by a party which are not
subject to disclosure.” The Chamber determined that records of questions put to witnesses by the Prosecution, and the answers
given, constitute witness statements under the
Rules. Private notes jotted down during the
course of an interrogation, or questions noted
but never asked, however, are privileged under
Rule 70 and their non-disclosure in this case
did not constitute an error by the Trial
Chamber. Furthermore, Appellant had not
“sufficiently demonstrated” that the witness
statements he objected to in fact existed.
Indeed, the senior trial attorney stated that the
Prosecution had “no such documents in its
possession.”
As to Appellant’s allegation that he had suffered prejudice when the Trial Chamber
allowed the Prosecution to call witnesses even
though he had not seen their allegedly unavailable statements, the Chamber noted that
Appellant had failed to demonstrate how he had
suffered prejudice as a result, particularly as his
counsel made no attempt to call any of the
Prosecution’s investigators to testify as to the
contents of the alleged statements. Appellant’s
additional claim that the Prosecutor had violated Rule 41 by not properly preserving all the
evidence at trial was dismissed by the Chamber
for vagueness, since no actual instance of such a
violation was identified.
The Chamber also addressed Appellant’s
claim that the Trial Chamber made general
errors of law in its approach to the evidence of
several witnesses, including reliance on uncorroborated testimony, the testimony of accomplices, and in-Chamber testimony inconsistent
with prior statements. In each instance, the
Chamber noted that the acceptance of, and
reliance on, such evidence did not per se constitute an error in law, so long as the Trial
Chamber took any inconsistencies into
account when weighing its probative value.
Moreover, when accomplice testimony is thor-

oughly cross-examined, as it was in the instant
case, no error of law has been committed.
Appellant further argued that the Trial
Chamber had erred in its assessment of identification/recognition evidence and in relying on
witnesses of questionable credibility.
Considering these claims on a witness-by-witness basis, the Chamber concluded that “in no
instance” did the Trial Chamber’s assessment of
evidence or testimony occasion a violation of
Rule 24’s “miscarriage of justice” standard.

SENTENCING
Due to the severity of Appellant’s crimes,
the Chamber concurred with the Trial
Chamber that the mitigating evidence offered
at trial as to Appellant’s good character was
insufficient to merit a lesser penalty and
upheld his sentence of life imprisonment.

SYLVESTRE GACUMBITSI V. PROSECUTOR,
CASE NO. ICTR-2001-64-T
On June 17, 2004, Trial Chamber III of
the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) delivered its judgment in
Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi. Sylvestre
Gacumbitsi was charged with criminal responsibility for his major role in organizing and
executing a campaign against Tutsi in the
Rusumo commune in April 1994 while he was
bourgmestre. The Trial Chamber found him
guilty of genocide and the crimes against
humanity of extermination and rape, and not
guilty of complicity in genocide and the crime
against humanity of murder. He was sentenced
to thirty years imprisonment.
In finding Gacumbitsi guilty of genocide,
the Trial Chamber examined his deeds and
words together. The Trial Chamber found he
demonstrated his genocidal intent through
urging the conseillers de secteur (lower-level government officials) to incite the Hutu to kill the
Tutsi, encouraging the Hutu public to rape
and kill Tutsi, and personally killing a Tutsi
(thereby signalling the beginning of an attack
at Nyarubuye Parish during which many Tutsis
were killed). His public instigations to rape
caused serious bodily harm to Tutsi women
and girls by leading directly to their rape by
Hutu attackers. He also planned, instigated,
ordered, committed, and aided and abetted the
killing of Tutsi civilians by convening a meeting of conseillers de secteur, instructing them to
incite Hutu to kill Tutsi, delivering boxes of
weapons to them, checking up on their efforts,
and personally killing a Tutsi. Moreover, his
speeches urging the Hutu public to kill Tutsi
40

led to several attacks, including one under his
direct supervision. Additionally, he assisted the
attackers by leading vehicle convoys, doing
nothing to prevent attackers from being transported in communal vehicles, and being present throughout the attacks. Although the Trial
Chamber found that he ordered the communal
policeman over whom he had formal superior
authority to kill, it did not find sufficient evidence that he ordered any other armed groups
to participate in the attacks. It determined that
neither Gacumbitsi’s superior authority over
these groups, nor circumstances suggesting
that his words would have been perceived by
them as orders, were established. After finding
that the charge of complicity in genocide was
an alternative count to genocide, the Trial
Chamber dismissed it without discussion.
Based on similar factual allegations as those
underlying the genocide charge, the Trial
Chamber found Gacumbitsi responsible for
extermination as a crime against humanity. It
determined that Gacumbitsi both knew of the
widespread and systematic attack that was taking place against the civilian population and
had the intent to participate in the massacre of
a large number of victims at Nyarubuye
Parish. His intent was shown by his leading
role in preparing and launching the attack, his
subsequent visits to the parish to instigate
attackers to kill survivors, and his supervision
of the attackers. The Trial Chamber found
Gacumbitsi not guilty of the crime against
humanity of murder, however, due to a lack of
evidence of his responsibility for the particular
murders listed in the indictment.
As noted above, Gacumbitsi was found to
have instigated the rape of several Tutsi women
and girls that led directly them being raped.
The Trial Chamber, however, found no link
between his words and other rapes that had a
more distant connection in time and space. In
finding Gacumbitsi guilty of the crime against
humanity of rape, the Trial Chamber determined that the definition of rape was not limited to “any penetration of the victim’s vagina
by the rapist with his genitals or with any
object.” It cited in support of this definition
the Akayesu Trial Judgment, which defined
rape “as a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances
which are coercive,” as well as the more recent
Kunarac Appeals Judgment by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which further
refined that standard to “the sexual penetration, however slight . . . of the vagina or anus .
. . or mouth of the victim without the consent
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of the victim.”
The Trial Chamber noted that the “victims’
lack of consent to the rapes” was adequately
established by the facts that Gacumbitsi threatened to kill them in an atrocious manner if
they resisted, and that the victims who did flee
were attacked. It is unclear from this statement
whether the Trial Chamber found the defendant’s threat or use of force necessary to establish the victim’s lack of consent. Earlier
jurisprudence by the Trial Chamber in
Semanza and Kajelijeli has established that
non-consent should be “assessed within the
context of the surrounding circumstances.”
This standard was supported by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in Kunarac, which then clarified that although “[f ]orce or threat of force
provides clear evidence of non-consent, . . .
force is not an element per se of rape.” It determined that
[t]here are ‘factors [other than force]
which would render an act of sexual
penetration non-consensual or nonvoluntary on the part of the victim.’ A
narrow focus on force or threat of force
could permit perpetrators to evade liability for sexual activity to which the
other party had not consented by taking advantage of coercive circumstances
without relying on physical force.
Significantly, it noted that “the circumstances . . . that prevail in most cases charged
as either war crimes or crimes against humanity will be almost universally coercive. That is to
say, true consent will not be possible.”

Similarly, in Blaskic, the ICTY Trial Chamber
allowed the cumulative application of personal
responsibility and command responsibility, but
in more recent cases, such as Krstic, Krnojelac,
and Naletilic & Martinovic, the Trial Chamber
has determined that only the mode of responsibility that most appropriately expresses the
accused’s culpability should be charged.
Nevertheless, in sentencing Gacumbitsi,
the Trial Chamber considered that his “active
participation in the said crimes explain[ed]
why he could not take measures [as a superior]
to prevent or punish the perpetrators” and
was an aggravating factor. In doing so, it
appears to have adopted the view of the
Ntagerura et al. Trial Chamber that the
alternative (uncharged) form of responsibility
should be considered in sentencing “in order
to reflect the totality of the accused’s culpable
conduct.”
HRB
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Because the Trial Chamber determined
that Gacumbitsi was personally responsible for
genocide and the crimes against humanity of
extermination and rape under Article 6(1) of
the ICTR Statute, it deemed it unnecessary to
decide whether he could also be held responsible as a superior under Article 6(3), because
these forms of responsibility “cannot be
charged cumulatively on the same basis of
facts. In case of cumulative charging, the Trial
Chamber will retain only the form of responsibility that best describes the Accused’s culpable
conduct.” This view seems to be in accord with
a movement by both Tribunals towards alternative charging under these articles. For example, the Kayishema Trial Chamber found that
these two forms of responsibility are “not
mutually exclusive,” but the more recent
Ntagerura et al. Trial Judgment found that they
are alternative modes of responsibility.

REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
continued from page 32

future investigations be handled in a way that
complies with the state’s international obligations, especially because so many victims are
reluctant to come forward and report these
human rights abuses for fear of retaliation.
The Commission’s report also focuses on
the Colombian government’s role in permitting the proliferation and impunity of paramilitary groups. The Commission is concerned that, despite their commitment to a
ceasefire agreement as a condition of the
demobilization process, AUC members continue to be implicated in serious human rights
violations, including massacres of defenseless
civilians; the selective assassinations of social
leaders, trade unionists, human rights defenders, judicial officers and journalists; and acts of
torture, harassment, and intimidation.
Although the Colombian government
claims it does not have an official policy of
encouraging paramilitary activity, the
Commission report reminds the government
that, under jurisprudence of the interAmerican system, the lack of an official policy
is insufficient to relieve any government of
liability for allowing paramilitary groups to
flourish. The Court and the Commission have
previously held governments responsible for
violating the Convention when state agents
acquiesce to paramilitary activities. The
Commission report calls on the Colombian
government to recognize its own responsibility
in facilitating the formation of some of the
paramilitary groups that have participated in
civilian massacres and other human rights
violations and criticizes it for failing to take the
measures necessary to prohibit, prevent, and
punish their criminal activities.
The Commission concludes that in order
to comply with international legal standards,
Colombia must uncover the truth of what has
happened in its civil conflict, including the
degree of government involvement in paramilitary activity. The Commission further recommends that the Colombian government adopt
a comprehensive legal framework that establishes clear conditions for the demobilization
of illegal armed groups to ensure that human
rights abusers are held accountable.
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